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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2366 
 ___________ 
 
 JACK A. SHULMAN, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 DONALD ZSAK; SPENCER DURKIN;  
 JOHN HEESTER; JOHN C. ENGLIS;  
 KEITH ALEXANDER; GARY ADLER;  
 BILL SHEA; L. E.; JOHN DOES 1-19 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:09-cv-02494) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 7, 2012 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  June 15, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 The appellant, Jack A. Shulman, requests review of an order from the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey that dismissed his amended complaint.  
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The defendants now move for summary affirmance.  For the following reasons, their 
motions are granted and the District Court‟s judgment will be summarily affirmed.  
 This case arises out of Shulman‟s ongoing dispute with the named state and 
federal defendants, and is not the first lawsuit addressing these circumstances.  Shulman‟s 
amended complaint,
1
 which is a lengthy, multi-part document heavy on intrigue and 
personal history but light on cohesion, appears to assume familiarity with the matters at 
hand and defies easy summary.  Shulman contended that some of the defendants denied 
him the benefits owed from his lengthy term of federal employment, by way of obscuring 
his employment records and refusing to acknowledge his federal service.  He also alleged 
that the defendants engaged in a retaliatory conspiracy to have him committed with the 
subsidiary purpose of calling his mental stability into question.  The plan came to fruition 
in June of 2008, when during an interview with a federal counter-terrorism unit, Shulman 
admitted that he was in possession of a handgun.  After a consent search, the gun was 
secured by agents, and Shulman was involuntarily committed for a mental health 
evaluation; in addition, criminal charges were filed against him in Union County.  This 
conduct, according to Shulman, violated his rights, and also amounted to a breach of 
contract.  All defendants were formally sued only in their official capacities.  See Pl‟s 
                                                   
1
 We cannot discern from the District Court docket whether the amended 
complaint was ever deemed formally filed.  Regardless, all parties, as well as the District 
Court itself, treated the amended complaint as the operative instrument of suit; we will 
follow their example, and in discussing the “amended complaint,” we include the 
complaint itself, the attached exhibits, and related matters of public record.  Mayer v. 
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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Reply & Br. ¶ 22, ECF No. 24-5.   
 The defendants, who were represented separately as state and federal groups, 
moved to dismiss the amended complaint,
2
 pointing out numerous flaws in its substance 
and defects in its preparation and service.  Agreeing with the defendants, the District 
Court granted their motions to dismiss.  The Court observed that Shulman‟s claims 
against the federal defendants appeared to request only injunctive relief, which was not 
warranted under the facts he described.  It also found no basis for sustaining Shulman‟s 
claims against the relevant state defendants.  Shulman moved for reconsideration
3
 and 
also filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In conducting plenary review of an 
order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we accept all 
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff‟s favor.  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam).  A motion to dismiss is properly granted if the factual proffer of the complaint 
does not allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
misconduct alleged.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) 
                                                   
2
 The state defendants‟ motion was actually captioned as requesting summary 
judgment, but advanced primarily arguments relating to defects under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) and was treated as such by the District Court. 
 
3
 The District Court denied Shulman‟s motion for reconsideration in June of 2011.  
Because Shulman did not file an amended or renewed notice of appeal afterwards, that 
order is not before us.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 
664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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(citing Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)).  Moreover: 
“After [Bell Atl. Corp. v.] Twombly, [550 U.S. 544 (2007),] and Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, [556] U.S. [662] (2009), „conclusory or bare-bones allegations will 
no longer survive a motion to dismiss: threadbare recitals of the elements of 
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.‟ 
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
While the complaint „does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.‟ 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.” 
Warren, 643 F.3d at 77.  “We can affirm a district court‟s disposition on grounds other 
than those on which the district court relied.”  Fairview Park Excavating Co. v. Al Monzo 
Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1123 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977).  Should we determine that an appeal 
presents no substantial question, we may affirm without requesting briefing from the 
parties.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d 
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 As a preliminary matter, Shulman did not clearly set out the theories under which 
he requested relief.  His amended complaint and its attachments were, at times, internally 
inconsistent.  Because Shulman has proceeded pro se throughout this suit, his 
submissions are entitled to be “liberally read under the relaxed standards applicable to a 
pro se complaint,” see Tunnell v. Wiley, 514 F.2d 971, 974 (3d Cir. 1975), and we will 
attempt to discern from his filings the extent of the relief sought from the defendants.  We 
will also consider, for the sake of a thorough consideration of the issues raised, whether 
Shulman can sustain claims against the defendants in their individual capacities as well as 
in their official capacities.  
 Having reviewed the record, we agree with the District Court that dismissal of the 
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complaint was warranted.  Shulman argued that his suit was “fundamentally” based on 42 
U.S.C. § 1985(1)–(2), which prohibits conspiracies to interfere with civil rights.  See Br. 
22, ECF No. 24-6.  Subsection (1) prohibits “two or more persons” from conspiring to 
interfere with a federal officer‟s performance of his duties, while subsection (2) addresses 
conspiracies to obstruct justice and to intimidate litigants and witnesses.  Desi‟s Pizza, 
Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 423 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003).  First, assuming that 
Shulman was actually a federal officer under the aegis of subsection (1), his pleading 
failed to present enough facts from which a court could plausibly infer a conspiracy to 
keep him from discharging his federal duties.  Shulman “contended” that defendant Inglis 
called defendant Adler and told him to frame Shulman, and that Adler then requested 
defendants Zsak, Heesters, and Durkin to carry out the plot.  Am. Compl. ¶ 3.  Other than 
this contention, which is clearly speculative, Shulman pleads no facts that would tend to 
show an agreement among the defendants to carry out these actions, and “the linchpin for 
conspiracy is agreement.”  Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm‟rs, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th 
Cir. 1992).  Shulman‟s recitation does not suffice to nudge his conspiracy claim across 
the line from “conceivable” to “plausible”; “nothing contained in the complaint invests 
either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566, 570.
4
  Second, while Shulman refers to actions taken to 
prevent one Doskey, a “key witness,” from “freely testify[ing] every time she was called 
upon to do so,” his assertion that the defendants “could easily conspire aga inst [Doskey] . 
                                                   
4
 We note, too, that the inconsistently described motives for taking the alleged 
action against him rob his conspiracy claim of some force.   
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. . by threatening her in a wide variety of ways” does not, without more, make out a claim 
under subsection (2).  We are left without a clear vision of what the defendants actually 
did, and even whether Doskey was available to testify at the proceedings in question.  An 
affiant, Charles Sutherland, claimed to have been intimidated by defendant Estores to 
keep him from testifying in favor of Shulman, but nowhere does Sutherland show that 
this was part of a conspiracy, and Shulman cannot otherwise assert a cause of action on 
Sutherland‟s behalf.  
 Shulman‟s remaining causes of action fare no better.  He claimed that the 
defendants violated the Privacy Act by the “hiding of plaintiff‟s work documents to avoid 
Congressional and DOD Scrutiny on the face of plaintiff‟s complaints.”  Reply and Br. 
¶ 5.  He also attacked the FBI‟s alleged “invasion of [his] office who then brought the 
Cranford Police in, and which resulted in the violation of [his] privacy.”  Reply and Br. 
¶ 25.  The Privacy Act allows Shulman access to records pertaining to him that are 
contained in an agency‟s system of records.  Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 360 (4th 
Cir. 1999).   In other words, the Act does not grant a cause of action for the latter claim.  
See 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g)(1).  While it may for the former, Shulman has not explained how 
the injunctive relief he sought related to the violation of the Act.  Shulman‟s 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983/Bivens
5
 claims against the official-capacity defendants were barred by doctrines 
of sovereign and Eleventh-Amendment immunity.  FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 
(1994); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010).  To the 
                                                   
5
 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). 
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extent that his complaint can be fairly read to imply a cause of action against the 
defendants in their individual capacities, the same pleading failures that undermined his 
§ 1985 claims also undercut his § 1983/Bivens claims.  His Fourth Amendment claim 
was conclusory, accusing the defendants of an improper warrantless search without 
additional context; his whistleblower claim lacked factual development.  And as the 
District Court noted on a prior occasion, the breach of contract claims were properly 
brought in the Court of Federal Claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).   
 As the above should make clear, Shulman‟s complaint was defective both by dint 
of lacking specificity and, paradoxically, for being overlong.  Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2), a complaint should set forth a “short and plain statement” of the grievances 
raised; incorporating, as Shulman has, a lengthy recitation of irrelevant facts, spread out 
across multiple documents and attachments, complicates a court‟s job of reviewing the 
complaint and the defendants‟ responsibility for responding in a timely and complete 
fashion.  See In re Schering-Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, Nos. 
10-3046 & 10-3047, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9832, at *37 (3d Cir. May 16, 2012); see 
also Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1988).  We have attempted, as 
per the above, to reach Shulman‟s actual claims, as did the District Court.  Having found 
them lacking, and concluding that further amendment of the complaint would prove to be 
futile, Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002), we grant the 
defendants‟ motions for summary action and will summarily affirm the judgment of the 
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District Court.
6
  All outstanding motions are denied. 
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 We note that an ongoing criminal case and additional, related cases in other 
federal courts raise the specter of preemption and claim/issue preclusion.  Because we 
affirm on the grounds discussed in the text, we need not reach these issues, nor the 
separate problem of faulty service identified by the District Court. 
